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Sentell,: Reapportionment and Local Government

REAPPORTIONMENT AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCrION
N June 15, 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
context of its decisions in Reynolds v. Sims" and companion
cases,2 put the finishing touches upon its evolving principle that state
legislatures must be apportioned on an equal population basis; i.e., the
"one-man-one vote" standard.8 This principle drew its commandment,
held the Court, from the equal protection provision of the fourteenth
4
amendment to the United States Constitution.
On May 22, 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States rendered
decisions in three cases which had confronted it for the first time with
questions on the relationship of the Reynolds principle to local governments throughout the country. 5 And although the Court left much yet
to be decided here, what it did undertake to establish is of the utmost
significance in pointing a possible way for the future. Perhaps even
more important, certainly of equal interest, is the almost three-year
period of lower court activity transpiring between the Supreme Court's
pronouncements. For both the state courts and the lower federal courts
across the nation had witnessed a vast amount of litigation seeking to
apply Reynolds to local governments. A view of illustrative attempts by
the courts to handle this litigation unfolds a judicial development of
genuine intrigue. 6
0

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B., 1956, LL.B.,
1958, University of Georgia, LL.M., 1961, Harvard Law School. Member of the Georgia Bar.
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877 U.S. 533 (1964).

2 WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation

v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 877
US. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
8 This principle had been building, of course, since the Court's decision in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), cleared away the jurisdictional cobwebs, and had evolved through
such decisions as Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), and Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964), dealing with equal population representation in respect to state officers and United

States Congressmen.
4 Throughout this article the terms, the "Reynolds principle." the "one-man-onc-vote
principle," and the "principle of equal population representation" will be used interchangeably.
5 Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967);
Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
6 Writings on the general subject have already appeared. The seminal effort is Welnstein, The Effect of the FederalReapportionment Decisions on Counties and Other Forms
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The basic question has been, and continues to be, whether the fourteenth amendment makes this command to local governments generally.
The wide range of views on this question constitutes a considerable
span. But even assuming applicability, as some courts have been willing
to do, problems of greater sophistication arise in rapid-fire succession.
Does the principle apply to other than local governing bodies? Does it
cut deeper than equally weighted voting so as to guarantee equally
weighted representation as well? Does its application depend upon the
office in question being an "elective" one? Could a state thus escape the
command by constituting its local government offices by an "appointive" process? Does the exercise of "legislative" type functions by the
office constitute a cornerstone determination here; and if so, are the
guidelines for recognizing these functions more definite than in other
areas of local government law? Should malapportionment be discovered, what relief can, and should, be provided?7 What are the alternative apportioning planis to which local governments can constitutionally
turn?" The possible enumerations seem limitless.
But to formulate these questions is not to imply that they have been,
or indeed that they can be, properly answered. Still, with respect to
most of them, some court somewhere has gone to the mat in search of a
solution. And it must be from this wrestling type process that the hope
for the future of local govern2ments and their citizens takes its roots.
At any rate, with the lower court experiences now accumulated, and
with the Supreme Court haying stepped up to the first plateau, the time
appears ripe for taking stock in order to see what, if anything, has been
learned. 9
II. IN THE STATE CoURTS
Although the one-man-one-vote principle was forged from the United
States Constitution by the Supreme Court, the contests radiating from
it have by no means been confined to the federal judiciary, Especially in
of Muniipql Government, 65 CoLUM. L. Rxy. 21 (1965), written toward the beginning of
the developments here traced and making some rather accurate predictions. Other briefer
treatments of interest include Note, 33 U. CIwc. L. REv. 483, 504 (1964); Note, 33 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 1132 (1965); Note, 44 NxB. L. REv. 850 (1965); Note, 53 VA. L REV. 953
(1967). Even the press has taken a crack at the subject; see, e.g., Moulton, One Man, One
Vote, One Brawl, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, April 9, 1967, p. 7-11, cols. 1-5.
7 Indeed, what base is to be used, and how is it to be determined?
8 For instance, what of an election-at-large or a weighted-voting escape?
9 That the Court will be forced to the next step in the near future appears likely. See.
e.g., its grant of certiorari at the dose of its last term, 87 S. CL 2106 (1967), in Avery v.
Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1966), cert. granted, 388 U.S. 905 (1967), which case
seemingly poses many of the questions here considered.
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respect to the application of this principle to local governments, the
nation's state courts have faced their fair share of the problems. Indeed,
some of their opinions are commonly acknowledged as leading ones on
the subject.
The purpose of this section is simply to reflect: upon some illustrations of this activity at the state court level, and to indicate the direction
which it has taken. Certainly no effort has been made to catalogue all
the local government apportionment decisions by the courts of the various states. Hopefully enough is done to depict these courts as they
hesitate over, maneuver around, and forthrightly confront this new
standard of constitutional law and its relationship to the local governments within their jurisdictions.
A. A Beginning
A general survey of the state court opinions reveals a number of
possible tactics with which a court might react as it begins, or refuses
to begin, to deal with reapportionment and local government.1 0 Prior to
the Supreme Court's express recognition of the problems of representative government in general, the typical state court tactic is classically
illustrated by Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections," a 1949
decision by the Court of Appeal of Louisiana. In that case a resident of
New Orleans attacked the statute providing for the election of the
municipal governing authority. In permitting him to vote for the
mayor and only one municipal commissioner, and in allowing each
municipal district, however unequally populated, to elect one commissioner,12 the statute was alleged to violate both the privileges and
immunities provision and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.' The Louisiana court's
rejection of the action was forceful:
[W]e do not see that by this contention there is raised any question
cognizable under the Federal Constitution for the reason... that
it is well settled that the right to vote in each State is given by the
State and may be curtailed by the state or controlled by the state so
10 Because of the recentness of this entire development of judicial supervision over governmental organization, the term "beginning" can here be used realistically.
11 43 So. 2d 514 (La. 1949).
12 Apparently the governing authority was fashioned in the commission form of local
government.
Is Indeed, the allegation ran, approximately one-half the population of the municipality
was represented by only two-sevenths of the commissioners.
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long as there is no violation of the Fifteenth Amendment or of the
14
Nineteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
In handling the fourteenth amendment contention, the court appeared to split its approach. On the one hand, the right to vote was not
guaranteed by the federal constitution, and the fourteenth amendment
did not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen. On the other
hand, even assuming that the arbitrary division of a municipality into
districts would violate "the fundamental rights""' of the voters, the
court could see no such arbitrariness here. Moreover, the court was
bound to assume that the legislature had acted with reasonableness.20
Tedesco, therefore, is representative of the state judiciary's response
to the plea for local government representation proportionate to population prior to the Supreme Court's pronouncements on state legislatures and congressional districts. In this sense it stands as the beginning
point of the path here to be traced. The tactic was simply refusal of
recognition of the proposition as a matter of federal constitutional law,
but was not one confined in application to state courts. For when the
plaintiff appealed the Louisiana court's decision, the Supreme Court
answered in one sentence: "The motion to dismiss is granted and the
appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question."'" The
proposition was only an idea whose time had not come.
Even after the Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims,18 other
tactics were available to state courts which wished to avoid immediate
confrontation with the problems. A pair of decisions by the Supreme
Court of Georgia will serve as illustrations. In Jowers v. Griffinl9 a
voter and resident brought action against the county democratic executive committee, challenging as unconstitutional a statute providing for
the at-large election of one commissioner from each of the county's
three commission districts.2 The plaintiff further sought to enjoin the
14 43 So. 2d at 517. Terming the Supreme Court's prior decisions on the general subject,
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), and Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), as
"most confusing," the Louisiana court could find nothing in either to support the plaintiff's argument here.
15 43 So. 2d at 518. The court did not specify the provisions of the Constitution which

might protect these rights.
16 Any sound reason for the plan of representation, which was a possible reason for the
enactment of the plan, was sufficient to eliminate the charge of discrimination.
17 Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
18 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
19 220 Ga. 242, 138 S.E.2d 370 (1964).
20 The only information on specific contentions of unconstitutionality provided in the

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss4/5

4

Sentell,: Reapportionment and Local Government

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:5 96

committee from certifying X (who received a majority of votes in the
county at large) as the party nominee for this position, and to mandamus it to certify Y (who received a majority of district votes). 21 The
Georgia court held against the plaintiff on two specified grounds: first,
that the committee was under no duty to certify Y, the plaintiff's peti.
tion conceding that the only election held was conducted under the
statute in question and that under that statute X was elected; and
second, that X was a necessary and indispensable patty to the action.
In the second and slightly later case dealing with the same county
position, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the county ordinary from placing
X's name on the general election ballot, and from permitting electors
residing outside the commission district to vote for the commissioher
of that district.2 2 But again the Georgia court summarily disposed of
the action by noting that since the decision of the lower court in the
case the general election had been coriducted and that in this election X
had received a majority of the votes cast both inthe commissidn district
and in the county at large. "Thus since all that was sought to be en.
joined has been done, the case has become moot and the writ of ertor
23
must be dismissed."
In both these cases, then, the basic complaint was of county'-wide
voting for district representatives on the bofird of county commissioners.
Although the maneuvering tactics represented by the decisions might
eventually be exhausted, they do successfully avoid forcing an immediate consideration of the Reyndlds principle at the level of couhty
government.
Both before and after the Supreme Court's one-man-one-vote enunciation, some state courts have faced the problems of reapportionment
and local government on non-federal grounds. For instance, in the
&
2 4 the action Was by residents
Ohio case of State ex -el. Scott v. Masterson
and electors of the City of Cleveland to mandamus the city council to
redistrict the municipality. The action was based on provisions of the
municipal charter that the councilmen Wete to be elected by wards, that
the wards "shall be as nearly equal in population as may be," 2 6 and that
the council was to redivide the municipality after each ddcennial fedopinion was the court's statement that the statute was alleged to be unconstitutional "for
various reasons." Id. at 243, 18 SkE.2d at 371.
21 The plaintiff alleged that he had voted for Y, and that his vote would be voided
under the statute.
22 Griffin v. Grantham, 220 Ga. 474, 139 SX.E2d 398 (1964).
23 Id. at 475, 139 S.E.2d at 399.
24 173 Ohio St. 402, 183 NXE.2d 576 (1962).
25 Id. at 402, 183 N.E.2d at 378.
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eral census. No such redivision had been effected, it was alleged, in 16
years. To the municipality's argument that the council's failure to act
was a lkgislative or pblitical matter, the Supreme Court of Ohio replied
that "one of the basic functions of the courts under our system of separation of powers is to compel the other branches of government to
tonform to the basic law."2 6 Thus the municipal council was held to be
under a mandatory duty to redistrict, but this duty was entirely dependent upon the charter command.
A similar tactic has been utilized by the Supreme Court of California.
In GriffiA v. Board of Supevisors27 that court interpreted a statute
dealing with county stupe-visorial district as having for its primary goal
"apportionment accbiding to poptilation."28 Armed with this interpretation, thic court iivalidated a plan of apportionment under which the
cotity Was composed of five districts, each of which elected one supervisor; and the districts were populted so that approximately 50% of
the county's electors r7sidltd in one district and only 11/% resided in
aiothe. 29 The court recognized that the statute in question enumerated
factors other than population to be considered in county apportionmdnt,30 bit held these to be only ubsidiary and incapable of warranting
sich deviation froi equiality of population. 31
The court *as also cohfronted with an argument that the statute, in
allowing the boitd itself t6 redistrict the county, had constituted the
matter one within the board's tomplete discretion. But the court refused to hold this dikcrtion urflimited, again noting the prominence of
pbpulation equality in the statutory schemb. 32 The abuse of this equality here, concluded the court, made it mandatory upon the board of
supervisors to redistrict the county "within a reasonable time,"' 3 with
the court retaining jurisdiction of the case.
These decisions by the courts of Ohio and California, both rendered
prior to the Supreme Court's federal formulation in Reynolds, illustrate
genuine state-court concern with the voice of the people in matters of
26 Id. at 404, 183 N.Ed at 379.
27 33 Cal. Rptr. 101, 384 P.2d 421 (1963).
28 Id. at 102,384 P.2d at 422-23.
29 Under this plan, the cburt cbhduded, a majority of the county board of supervisors

was elected by approximateiy 17% of the voters.
30 Eg., t oography, geography, cohesiveness and compactness of territory, and community of interests.
31 The court utilized "legislative intent" as a foundation for this interpretation. 33 Cal.
Rptr. at 103, 384 P.2d at 423.
32 The court found it necessary to "disapprove" of two of its own prior dedsions to
downplay the element of board discretion. Ibid.
83 Id. at 104,384 P.2d at 424.
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local government. Armed with the state statutes noted, these courts felt
no necessity to talk in terms of constitutional rights and protections.
Nevertheless, the one-man-one-vote guarantee appeared effective as a
matter of state law. Still more light can be shed upon these tactics, however, by continuing with the California story.
When the board of supervisors of Monterey County redistricted the
county, as commanded by the court, its efforts were again challenged, 4
The new plan allowed a ratio between the districts of highest and lowest
population of 2.2 to 1, still too great a deviation from equality of population, the argument ran, to comply with the state statute. Obviously
more pleased with the new plan than the old,85 the California court now
turned to those other factors in the state statute which it had softpeddled the first time around. Matters of topography, geography, cohesiveness of territory, and community of interests of the districts now
became the focal points of the court's investigation.3 0 And by a consideration of the make-up of each of the new districts, the court satisfied
itself that these matters were sufficient to justify the deviation from the
standard of equality of population as commanded by the statute.87
But the court could not yet draw the blinds. For also included in the
challenge to the new plan of county apportionment was a contention
that it violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Affording this argument
only incidental attention, the court simply refused to believe that these
factors additional to equality of population would not also be considered in determining equal protection,8 8 and added this significant observation:
Moreover, in view of differences between county and state governments, there are additional considerations applicable to county
districting which can justify a departure from equality of population. County governments perform a number of important func.
tions for unincorporated areas which are ordinarily performed
Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 36 Cal. Rptr. 616, 388 P.2d 888 (1964).
35 "The new ordinance is obviously a great improvement over the prior system ....
Id. at 617, 388 P.2d at 889.
88 E.g., the district with the smallest population contained 71% of the county's land
84

area; the boundary line between certain districts ran through rough forest lands which
formed a natural division; the large city in the county did not wish to be divided.
87 At any rate, under the new plan a majority of the members of the board would be
elected from districts having a majority of the population. Also, the court cautioned, each
plan of county apportionment would have to be tested individually.

88 The court saw several cases dealing with state legislative reapportionment as upholding its position.
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entirely or in large part by city governments in incorporated
areas. 39
Thus, the new plan was held not to violate the equal protection clause.
Equality of population thus remained the standard, but a standard not
susceptible of application in the abstract.40
B. A Change in Tempo
Discussion thus far has focused upon various state courts as they
began to work with the proposition that the one-man-one-vote principle
should be applied to local governments. These courts have been viewed
in refusing to recognize the principle, in avoiding direct confrontation
with the principle, and in striving toward achievement of the principle
on local grounds. A survey of the jurisdictions reveal, however, several
court opinions in which a kind of change in tempo can be sensed. These
might be termed transitional opinions, opinions in which the courts
appear more receptive to the proposition, though not completely so.
Perhaps this is not true, perhaps no distinctions exist between these
opinions and those already considered; but at any rate they will here
be discussed in that light.
The Mississippi case of Glass v. Election Comm'n 4' presented the
contention that the failure of the Board of Supervisors to redistrict the
county "with due regard to equality of population," 42 as required by
state statute, constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws. The
plaintiff sought to enjoin the holding of further elections until the
board, or the court, had redistricted the county. 43 The Supreme Court
of Mississippi affirmed the lower court in sustaining a demurrer to
the plaintiff's petition, but the tenor of the court's opinion appears
rather sensitive to the claims made. The court noted that reapportionment is essentially a legislative function, and examined the state statute
in question. This statute, concluded the court, specified certain avenues
toward county redistricting, none of which had been utilized by the
plaintiff: "Injunction will not lie where there is a remedy by manda39 36 Cal. Rptr. at 619, 388 P.2d at 891.
40 For other California cases following the Grifin decisions, and emphasizing this non-

federal ground tactic of the California Supreme Court, see Henderson v. Superior Court,

37 Cal. Rptr. 438. 390 P.2d 206 (1964); Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 37 Cal. Rptr. 440,
390 P.2d 208 (1964).
41 250 Miss. 40, 156 So. 2d 825 (1963).
42 Id. at 46, 156 So. 2d at 828.
43 The petition was thus one in equity.
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mus." 44 The court took pains to point up even the board's concession
that the county should be redistricted as well as its promise that the job
would be undertaken when conditions within one of the county "beats"
became more settled. 45 The court was apparently impressed by the
sincerity of the board and sympathetic with the conditions described:
"In other words, it is hard to see just what way at this time an adequate
and just redistricting could be made." 40
The Glass decision, therefore, might be just another illustration of
a state court avoiding the important issue, or a situation which was
handled by local provisions. 47 Still, one can detect a note of concern in
the court's opinion.
Similarly mild in result but convincing in sincerity was the opinion
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Davis v. Dusch.48 The
challenge was to the apportionment of the City of Virginia Beach, and
the relief sought was to mandamus a reapportionment by the city
council. The municipal charter provision under attack provided for
seven boroughs within the municipality, one borough to elect five mem.
bers of the council, with each of the remaining boroughs electing one
member. The inequality of population among the boroughs was alleged
to violate the fourteenth amendment. Although the Virginia court,
again, refused relief to the plaintiffs, its opinion reveals a searching
analysis of the special situation before it and a keen awareness of its
sensitivity. First, the court noted the unavailability of the writ of
mandamus in a doubtful case. Further, it analyzed the hierarchy of
material statutory provisions dealing with the apportionment of the
municipality and concluded that the state legislature had been author.
4
ized to enact a special apportionment provision for it.
9 The court
explained that the municipality in question had resulted from a consolidation of a city and county ih 1963 and that many problems had
44 250 Miss. at 50, 156 So. 2d at 839. The court noted that 25% of the electors could
require the board to call a special election on redistricting, and if the board refused to
effect a plan approved by the election, it could be mandamused to do so.

45 The United States Government had taken over practically the whole of one of the
districts for a space project, and this was creating much change in the district and in the
county itself.
46 250 Miss. at 53, 156 So. 2d at 831.

47 The United States Supreme Court was no more sympathetic; it dismissed the appeal
and denied certiorari. 378 U.S. 558 (1964).
48 205 Va. 676, 139 S.E.2d 25 (1964).
49 It read the Virginia Constitution as authorizing special statutes concerning municipalities notwithstanding another constitutional provision commanding decennial municipal
reapportionments.
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been encountered in effecting the combination, not the least of which
had been the system of representation to be utilized r. The legislature,
recognizing this problem, had acted in a completely logical manner in
excepting the newly-created municipality from general statutes which
would have commanded a reapportionment almost immediately, and
instead providing specially that a reapportionment could be made
within five years and must be made within eight years. "Under such
circumstances, the exercise of sound judicial discretion does not sanc51
tion the action here sought."
Here, then, the court provided no discussion of the validity of the
present apportionment of the municipality,52 but was vitally concerned
with the situation in the concrete.0 And though this decision too might
be lumped among those others where state courts have been reluctant
to act, the change in tempo seems present.
Still another transition type decision was that by the Supreme Court
of Michigan in Brouwer v. Bronkema,54 an action commenced immediately after the Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds. Here challenged
was the apportionment of a county board of supervisors to which each
township in the county sent one representative, and each city sent such
representatives as the legislature may provide, with the result that approximately 60% of the county's population was represented by less
than one-third of the total membership of the board. The decision by
the lower court in the case is a well-known one, as it was the first to
require application of the Reynolds principle to county government.5 5
This position, however, was affirmed only by an equal division of the
Supreme Court of Michigan. Even the opinion upholding the lower
court began by conceding that Reynolds did not per se apply to local
50 Said the court: "[Tio order now a reapportionment of the city and the election of a
new council might be to strike the blow which would cause the new city to die aborning."

205 Va. at 685, 139 S-E2d at 30-31.
51 Id. at 685, 139 S.E.2d at 30.
52 "[T]he question is not whether disproportionate representation, which might need
correction, does, in fact, exist in the city." Id. at 652, 139 S.E.2d at 29.
53 "One would have to be naive, indeed, to believe that if those special provisons had
not been granted the formation of the city would, notwithstanding, have still resulted."

Id. at 684, 139 S.E.2d at 30.
54 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1965).

55 No. 1855, Cir. Ct. Kent County, Mich., Sept. 11, 1964. See the description of the lower
court's decision in Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decision on
Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLust. I REV. 21, 26-28 (1965).
Basically, the court decided that the county, a depositary of legislative powers delegated
to it by the state, must possess a legislative body apportioned in the same manner as the
state itself.
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governments, but argued that this did not preclude a state court from
deciding such a case.5 6 In deciding this case, the opinion set out to
analyze the system of representation presented.5 7 The equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, concluded the opinion, was not
limited to protecting only those rights expressly granted by the federal
constitution, such as the right to vote for state legislators, but extended
to all rights and against all forms of state action. Thus, the point that
the Constitution does not grant the right to vote for local government
officials became immaterial in distinguishing this case from Reynolds."
Also noted by the opinion was the point that it was not here concerned
with a system which authorized the selection of all county legislative
officers by means other than election.5 9 These points aside, the opinion
then hastened to a conclusion invalidating the county apportionment.
This apportionment, said the opinion,
must be declared void because it discriminates invidiously against
the residents of large townships and cities by diluting the weight
accorded their votes in relation to the weight accorded the votes of
the residents of smaller townships.6 0
By a dissenting opinion in Brouwer,6 1 and a separate opinion in the
companion case of Knudsen v. Klevering, 2 an equal number of Michigan's justices went the other way. The dissent took the position, first,
that because Reynolds applied only to state legislatures, the states remained free to copsider factors other than population in apportioning
local governments. 3 Indeed, the dissent conjectured that this might
well be the position of the Supreme Court itself when presented with
such a case.6 4 Moreover, argued the dissent, with a reapportioned state
56

"We State judges, like our Federal Supreme Court superiors, are sworn to uphold the

Federal, as well as the State, Constitution." 141 N.W2d at 108.
57 The court was forced to exert great effort to conclude that the representatives sent
to the board by cities must, like those sent by townships, be elected by the people they
represented. Were this not the construction to be given the statutory and constitutional
set-up, said the court, it would be unconstitutional on that basis. See 141 N.W.2d at 112.
58 This was one of the distinctions which had been argued.
59 Such a system, said the court, would present further questions, both of a federal and
state nature. See 141 N.W.2d at 116-17.
60 141 N.W.2d at 112. The opinion would withhold judicial relief until the legislature
had an opportunity to act, but would retain jurisdiction of the case.
61 141 N.W.2d at 118.
02 377 Mich. 666, 141 N.W.2d 120 (1966).
63 The dissent refused to believe that under the federal constitution the states "were
required to impose on every subdivision of their local governments the nose.counting
principle of pure democracy...." 141 N.W.2d at 119.
64 "I have some trepidation that if I said judicially the Federal Equality Clause did so
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legislature and the tools of initiative and referendum at their command,
the citizens of the state could effectively rectify any unfairness in the
apportionment of county boards.
The Knudsen opinion 5 also counseled against the state court's attempting "to outrun the Supreme Court of the United States."100 Although its writer believed that the Court would eventually hold the
Reynolds principle applicable to local governments, he argued strongly
for simply retaining jurisdiction in both Brouwer and Knudsen, but
deciding neither case at the present. 7 "For once," he said, "there is no
68s
need of haste."
Thus, Michigan's Supreme Court found itself split down the middle
on the advisability of holding the Reynolds principle applicable to local
governments within the state. The lively debate here summarized, therefore, appropriately concludes this consideration of the change-of-tempo
cases.
C. Breakthrough
Not all state courts have been so reluctant to consider whether the
one-man-one-vote principle of the Supreme Court in regard to state
legislatures should be declared applicable to local governments. Indeed,
a number of courts have dealt with the question, and, moreover, have
answered it in the affirmative. The time for sketching these cases, and
for noting the various ramifications into which they proceed, has now
arrived.
The first state supreme court to take the plunge was that of Wis00
consin, in the celebrated case of State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester.
require I might well be found to have marched myself forward right out of the judicial

parade when the Federal Supreme Court finally chooses to speak on this point." 141
N.V.2d at 120.
65 In Knudsen the lower court had refused to apply Reynolds to another board of
county supervisors in Michigan. The justices upholding the lower court in Brouwer thus
disagreed. This separate opinion was written for the position of not deciding either case
but of retaining jurisdiction only. 141 N.V.2d at 121.
6 Ibid.
67 "Where does this leave us, hopelessly divided as we seem to be? Should the Court

proceed now (presumably by equally divided vote) to affirm both decisions, the contradictory legal situation in the bordering counties of Muskegon and Kent would approach
the unbelievable." 141 N.W.2d at 122.
68 141 N.W.2d at 122. He noted that several federal cases were then winding their way
toward the Supreme Court.
69 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.V.2d 249 (1965). For a preliminary decision in the case, clearing
the court's jurisdictional decks, see State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 25 Wis. 2d 177, 130
N.V.2d 569 (1964). For other discussion of the decision, see Note, 33 GEo. WASH. L.REv.
1132 (1965); 44 NEa. L. REv. 850 (1965).
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The statute there challenged provided that the boards of supervisors for
the counties of the state should be composed of the chairman of each
town board and a supervisor from each city ward and village in the
county.70 Because thb populations of these towns, cities, arid villages
differed greatly, the county boards of supervisors- were highly disproportionate in representing the population of the county. Thus, the
question Was squarely posed: Did the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment proscribe inequality of population reptesentation on the county boards? In holding that it did, the Wisconsin court
71
was forced to wrestle a number of contentions.
In meeting the argument that the county was simply a statutory
creation of the state, formed without the direct consent of thd people
affected, and perfcwmed only functionS delegated to it by the state, the
court replied that these points were not "determinative of whether the
14th Amendment applies to their composition when the members of a
county board are determined by the elective process.172 Indeed, noted
the court, the legislature "has granted a substantial bundle of legislative
powers to county boards,"73 and "since the composition of the legislatute must conforih to the principle of equal representation, it is logical
that the arm or political subdivision of each such legislature enacting
legislation shdtld be governed by the same principle ot equal representation."14 This Wotild not be true if the county performed solely
administrative duties, said the court, nor did it mean to decide that
"every legislative function requires representative-elective execution."78
Admittinig that no sister state court of last resort had yet taken this
step,76 the Wisconsin court nevertheless made short shrift of the argument for waiting for the United States Supreme Court to speak on the
matter: "[I]t is the duty of this couit to decide questions properly presented to it whether they have been expressly decided by the United
States supreme court or not . . . ,,7 Thus, the snag, upon which the
Michigan court in Brouwer had hung itself, was downed.
70
71

The statute applied to all Wisconsin counties except two.
The court summarily discounted the point that the right to vote for members of

county boards was not granted by the Constitution. See 132 N.W.2d at 255.
72 132 N.W.2d at 255.
78 Id. at 256.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid. "We hold only that the principle of equal representation applies to a county
board of supervisors When that board is given legislative power and Is comp~osed of elective
inembers." Ibid.
76 The court did sutnniarize the lower court's holding in Btouwer v. Proilmhea.
77 132 N.W.2d at 256.
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The conclusion of unconstitutionality having been reached, the court
refused to take further action, but retained jurisdiction of the case in
the event a valid plan of apportionment was not forthcoming by a
78
specified date.
Sylvester, then, was the ground-breaking decision at the state court
level. As noted, it dealt with a number of the contentions typically
raised by those advocating the opposite position. Although still other
considerations emerge in the cases yet to be discussed, Sylvester sets the
tone for further developments.
In a similar vein, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, invalidated the apportionment of large boards 0f freeholders for
three counties in that state.79 Without considering the results of the
particular apportionments considered, the court simply declared them
"clearly malapportioned."80 The New Jersey court did, however, elaborate just a bit upon the types of powers exercised by these county
governing bodies which rendered them susceptible to the Reynolds
principle. The power to tax, to appropriate, and to penalize were all
enumerated in concluding that "if the State Legislature must conform
to the principle of equal protection, it is logical that the 'county legislature' should conform to the same principle."si Thus, the term "legislative powers," isolated for treatment in Sylvester, was here further
developed.
One other point dealt with by the New Jersey court was the self-help
contention, the argument that the court should not interfere when the
citizens involved were statutorily entitled to conduct a referendum to
change their governing body. The court replied to this argument by
quoting the United States Supreme Court in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
Gen. Assembly, s2 a decision concerning a state legislature:
An individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally
weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of a
State's electorate, if the apportionment scheme adopted by the
voters fails to measure up to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.s3
78 The court noted too the appointment of a study committee by the legislature for the
purpose of determining the best method of county board apportionment.
79 Mauk v. Hoffman, 87 NJ. Super. 276, 209 A.2d 150 (1965).
80 209 A.2d at 152.
81 Ibid. "A county," said the court, "is generally considered a political subdivision or
agency of the State." Ibid.
82 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
83 209 A.2d at 153-54, quoting from 377 U.S. at 736.
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The court specified a date by which it would take further action if
84
no "political solution" were forthcoming.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota too has entered the thicket of
reapportionment and local government. In Bailey v. Jones8 5 that court
invalidated an apportionment entailing a five-man board of county
commissioners, one commissioner elected from each of five districts, and
resulting in two of these commissioners representing approximately
65,000 people and three commissioners representing only 21,000 persons. In so holding, the court again focused upon the types of powers
exercised by the boards. It noted the zoning power, the power to regulate bridges and highways, the power to maintain public parks and the
like, and the power of taxation. Whether the court viewed these as
strictly "legislative" powers, it did not say. Instead, it termed these
powers "discretionary," and, in practice, "final."'80 "In effect," concluded the court, "they both manage and govern the counties." 87 Perhaps, therefore, this court did not see any necessity for determining that
the county board performed pure "legislative" powers before it could
conclude that the one-man-one-vote principle applied to it. If this is
true, it constitutes the most liberal approach which has yet been noted.8 8
Another argument made against reapportionment in Bailey was that
the state constitution did not command county commissioners to be
elected, but would also permit their appointment. Accordingly, the
argument ran, the commissioners were not elective officials under the
gun of the Reynolds standard. The court deftly sidestepped the substantive significance of this argument by simply pointing out that the
commissioners involved in this case were elected by the people of the
county. 89
To the self-help contention, under an initiative and referendum provision, the South Dakota court also relied upon the Lucus language,
concluding that "it is a truism that a citizen's constitutional rights
84 209 A.2d at 155. Possibilities of a solution were thought to be the people voting to
switch to a small board of freeholders for a governing body, or petitioning their state
representatives to change the make-up of their large boards.
85 139 N.W.2d 385 (S.D. 1966).
80 Id. at 388.
87 Ibid.
88 "Boards of County Commissioners are representative of the people and by parity of
reasoning the concepts of equal protection as delineated by, and in conformity with, the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court applies [sic] to them." Ibid.
89 And, "to be a valid vote it must be a vote that will insure equal representation." Ibid.
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cannot be infringed simply because a majority of the people choose it
to be. ' 90
Finally, the court saw no reason for its citizens to be forced to turn
to the federal courts for relief here. "State courts . . . are required to
hear, and determine such actions whether a violation of the State Constitution or the laws and Constitution of the United States be at issue.",
In Minnesota the supreme court was confronted with the validity of
a statute which limited cities of certain classes to two representatives on
the board of county commissioners, no matter what the population of
the city may be.92 In holding this statute violative of equal protection,
this court joined those which have been considered in this section. The
court rendered its decision in the case of Hanlon v. Towey, 13 where it
concluded from the Supreme Court decisions rendered at that point
that "there is every indication that the right to vote for representatives
upon a county board as presently constituted in our state does have
constitutional significance. '94 The court conceded that the state legislature possessed the apparent constitutional freedom to withdraw county
government from "electorial control," but that freedom had not thus
far been exercised.9 5 The court further refused to view the Minnesota
county as only an administrative unit of local government, pointing to
its powers over taxation, budgeting, capital improvements, welfare,
health, the administration of justice, and zoning. These were considered "substantial" legislative powersY0
Although, therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion was a
strong one for applying the federal reapportionment standards to local
government, it broke the pattern of the previously described cases in
expressing concern over the far-reaching impact of its decision. Reapportionment upon a population basis alone conflicted with the state's
prior approval of recognizing differing interests between rural and
urban residents of a county.9 7 Moreover, the court thought, it could
at 389.
91 Ibid. This court also specified a date by which corrective action must be taken.
92 This had resulted, in the particular county involved in the suit, in a majority of the
board of commissioners being elected by only 38% of the county's population. Hanlon v.
Towey, 274 Minn. 187, 142 N.W.2d 741, 742 (1966).
93 274 Minn. 187, 142 N.V.2d 741 (1966).
94 Id. at 193, 142 N.V.2d at 745.
95 Neither did the court give any weight to the point that the right to vote in Mtinnesota
was granted by statute rather than by the constitution. See 142 N.W.2d at 746.
96 Id. at 747.
97 The resolution of this seeming impasse can have a profound effect upon county
government as it now exists." Ibid.
90 Id.
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result "in unfair domination by the voters of the area of greater population."98 All problems, however, could not be settled in the context of
this one decision.99
The state which has probably experienced the greatest amount of
local government reapportionment litigation thus far is that of New
York. Its courts, from the lowest to the highest, have found themselves
submerged iri considerations of the types thus far noted. One of the
earliest of these cas~s, presenting the typical challenge, was that of
Gol6dsein v. Rockefdiler.10° Here placed in issue was the validity of the
state statute, as operative iri Monroe County, constituting the supervisors of the city wards and of the towns in the county as the county
board of supervisors. The Supreme Court of Monroe County described
the existing apportionment there is making it possible for one-fourth
of the county's popUl~ition to elect a majority of the members of the
board. This, said the to-itt, clearly violated the Reynolds standard, if
that standard was applicable to county boards of supervisors. Then:
I conclude that the 'one person, one vote" principle applies to the
election of members of the Monroe County Board of Supervisors
and that the present apportionment both with respect to the town
supervisors and the districting of the city wards violates the equal
protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States ConstitUtion.i0i
Thus, the application of the statute in Monroe County was invalidated. 02
With this miriimum of fanfarej103 the Supreme Court of Monroe
County began a development of considerable magnitude in thd State of
New York. 104 For instance, in reliance upon Goldstein the Supreme
Court of Sullivan County condemned an apportionment in that county
98 Ibid.
99 The court did offer the thought that "perhaps one solution may be found In de-

vising procedures which will afford protection to the minority population possessing the
greater interest." Ibid.

45 Misc. 2d 778, 257 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1965).
101 257 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
102 The court, although urged to do so, refused to declare the statute completely unconstitutional, "since there may be counties in which its application does not result In an
100

unconstitutionally apportioned board bf supervisors." Id. at 1003-04.
103 E.g., this court did not worry about the type function performed by the board.

104 It also held the apportionment to violate the New York Constitution. As for relief,
the court specified a deadline by which it would take furthet action if a valid apportionment was not sooner forthcoming.
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where "eight sUpervisors, representing slightly less than 20% of the
County's population, can prevail over seven representing slightly more
than 80% of the population."'1 5 This was the case of Shilbury v. Board
of Supervisors,10 6 where the court practically assumed the applicability
of the Reynolds principle to county boards, 107 but evidenced more concerii than had Goldstein in respect to the relief to be granted. The court
sympathized with officials bearing the responsibility of reapportionment, noting that they "are operating in a very difficult and rather
novel field bf the law, where the answers are not all clear or complete
and where further guidance from the Court of Appeals and the United
States Supreme Court is awaited .. ,,"08 Still, thought the court, some
immediate relief should be forthcoming. In this quandary, the court
turned to the device of "weighted voting" 10 9 and ordered that until a
valid apportionment plan was formulated, 1 0 each of the current supervisors
shall be entitled.., to cast... a number of votes equal to the
quotient in whole numbers obtained by dividing the number of
inhabitants of the town from which he has been elected, as determined by the latest federal census covering all towns in the County,
by five hundred, except that and providing further than no supervisor shall have less than one vote."'
Continuing with the New York litigation, the Supreme Court of
Broome County, in Augostini v. Lasky," 2 invalidated the apportionment of a county board under which "the 15 least populous wards and
towns, representing less than 20o of the population of the county, elect
a majority of the Board of Supervisors."" 3 Again, the applicability of
105 Shilbury v. Board of Supervisors, 46 Misc. 2d 837, 260 N.Y.S.2d 931, 935 (1965). The
county consisted of 15 towns of widely differing populations.
106 46 Misc. 2d 837, 260 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1965).
107 The court did point out, however, that these were "elected" supervisors, composing
a "legislative" body. See 260 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
108 Id. at 937.
109 The court Utilized the following definition of "weighted voting": "The s)stem under
which current membership of a legislative body is continued but which gives numbers
of votes to individual members depending upon the numerical relationships among the
populations which they represent." Id. at 936.
110 A deadline was specified.
M' 260 N.YS.2d at 938. This judgment and order was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, Third Department, in Shilbury v. Board of Supervisors, 25 App. Div. 2d
688, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1966).
112 46 Misc. 2d 1058, 262 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1965).
"13 262 N.Y-S.2d at 599.
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the one-man-one-vote principle seemed fairly settled to the court; but
it was confronted with the self-help defense, the point that in two fairly
recent referendums the people of Broome County had rejected proposals which would have provided the more populous areas with greater
representation. Utilizing the Lucas approach, the court designated this
defense as "without merit."1 14 Thus, the New York court joined with
those state courts previously noted in treating the self-help contention
at the local government level.
The case of Treiber v. Lanigan"15 presented two significant points
different from the New York cases thus far considered. First, the apportionment invalidated, although not materially different, was commanded by the county code rather than the general state statute, the county
having availed itself of home rule powers in 1961.110 In reaching its
decision, the Supreme Court of Oneida County saw the Reynolds principle as applying to "all municipalities, villages, towns, cities and
counties, as political subdivisions of the State and exercising only those
powers delegated to them by the State... ... 11 Second, in granting relief
for the malapportionment, the court utilized the device of abbreviating
the terms of office of newly elected supervisors and ordering that they
provide a valid reapportionment within a specified time after taking
office. 118 Thus, still another means of correction was revealed. 110
Indicating the extent to which the New York courts had now been
propelled in applying the Reynolds principle to county government is
the following pronouncement by the Supreme Court of St. Lawrence
County in Dona v. Board of Supervisors:120 "That the principle of one
person, one vote applies to Legislatures below the level of the State has
been held in many cases and it does not seem necessary to discuss the
principle any more."'u 2 Here invalidated was an apportionment under
which "approximately 20% of the population, controls the voting of
2
the entire population."'t
Id. at 602. The court specified a deadline by which it would take further action.
15 48 Misc. 2d 434, 264 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1965).
110 The code constituted the supervisors of the towns or cities in the county as the
board of supervisors.
117 264 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
118 Supervisors to be elected in January 1966 were to reapportion by March 1966.
119 The court's decision was affirmed, after a time modification, by the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in Treiber v. Lanigan, 25 App. Div. 2d 202, 269
N.Y.S.2d 595 (1966).
120 48 Misc. 2d 876, 266 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1966).
121 266 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
122 Ibid. In granting relief, the court refused to adopt a "weighted vote" approach, and
114
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The final -3 county government reapportionment case to be noted
from New York at this point is Town of Greenburgh v. Board of Supervisors,-2 4 in which the Supreme Court of Westchester County invalidated
the apportionment of a county board of supervisors under which "a
majority of the board can be elected by the voters in towns and cities
which have less than 40% of the population of the county .... ,"5But
still a further and more complicated point was argued in Greenburgh;
viz., that the charters of various cities in the county were also unconstitutional in that each provided for an arbitrary number of supervisors
regardless of the city's population.'- 0 But on this intriguing point, the
court drew the line:
None of the City Charters is per se unconstitutional in so far as it
provides for the election of an arbitrary number of city officers,
nor is the Town Law invalid in so far as it provides that each town
in Westchester County shall have a supervisor. Inequality in representation in the [county] Board, as between the cities and the
towns, arises froin the operation of other statutes.'m
In considering the problems of reapportionment and local government, the New York courts have not confined their attention to counties. This point can appropriately be made by describing the course of
the litigation entitled Seaman v. Fedourich through the state's judicial
system. This originated as an action by citizens and voters of a municipality challenging the validity of a system of apportionment under
which the municipality's common council consisted of one representative from each of 13 municipal wards without regard to the ward's
population.1 m8 This apportionment raised the possibility that "seven
councilmen representing less than twenty-seven per cent of the population of the City of Binghamton might enact laws and ordinances not
favored by those representing more than seventy per cent of the populainstead simply directed the county board to formulate a valid apportionment by a sped.
fled time. See Id. at 234.
=2 For another attack on the validity of apportionment of still another county board,
but a case in which the county court held the issue not actually joined, see Graham v.
Board of Supervisors, 49 Misc. 2d 459, 267 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1966).
124 49 Misc. 2d 116, 266 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1966).
125 266 N.Y.S.2d at 1001-02. This apportionment was commanded by the county charter.
Further, this court too rejected the self-help defense.
126 I.e., each provided that that municipality was to have a governing body of a
specified size.
127 266 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
38 Seaman v. Fedourich, 45 Misc. 2d 940, 258 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1965).
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tion ... "-129 The Supreme Court of Broome County found little difficulty in invalidating the apportionment: "That the 'one person, one
vote' principle is applicable to the apportionment of elected members
of legislative bodies of governmental units below the level of state
legislatures can no longer be doubted."'' 0 The court enjoined the holding of any future elections under the Apportionment and retained
jurisdiction to review any reapportionment which might be forthcoming.
The reapportionment which was forthcoming consisted of the common council's adoption of a division of the municipality into seven
"councilmanic districts" to replace the wards.131 But because of alleged
"natural geographic divisions," 132 the boundaries of the districts generally followed those of the previous wards, resulting in a population
difference in two of the districts of 15,000 to 7,000. Exercising its retained jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Broome County held that
the reapportionment effort possessed a geographic basis, "and subordinates population as a primary consideration and, therefore, does
not meet constitutional requirements.' 1 3 The court also took the occasion to comment upon the correct method of determining the popula.
tions of various units. First, it held error in the exclusion from one
proposed district of some 3,000 "residents" of the Binghamton State
Hospital;'84 and second, it laid down the precept that "in any instance
in which population is to be determined the latest United States Census
is the only authorized basis for computation" 8 5 in New York. 180
The county court's decisions were affirmed on appeal by the New
York Court of Appeals1' with that court taking the following approach:
It is axiomatic that local governmental units are creations of,
and exercise only those powers delegated to them by, the State ...
and, certainly, if the latter may exercise its legislative powers only
129

258 N.Y.S.2d at 155-56.

1380Id at 155.

Seaman v. Fedourich, 258 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1965).
at 1009.
133 Id. at 1011-12.
'34 The court said these residents were a part of the population and could not be
excluded from a ward, district, or the total population of the city. Id. at 1010,
135 Id. at 1011. The council had attempted to estimate increases and decreases in population since 1960.
136 The court's decision was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, Third Department, in Seaman v. Fedourich, 259 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1965), and
application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals was granted.
137 Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965).
131

132 Id.
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in a body constituted on a population basis, any general elective
municipal organ to which it delegates certain of its powers must,
by a parity of reasoning, be subjected to the same constitutional
13 8
requirement.
Even accepting the council's own figures, the court held, the reapportionment proposal failed to meet constitutional requirements.1 03 But
the court went further to expressly sustain the lower court's condemnation of the council's determination of population. It agreed that the
law of New York commanded that the latest official census must be employed, and that the exclusion of the patients at the state hospital
"without any investigation of relevant factors-such as, for instance,
where they had previously lived and where they had voted in the pastis arbitrary and discriminatory."'140
Thus stymied in efforts at reapportionment, and facing an election
for a portion of the council in the immediate future, certain of the
council members sought to have the Supreme Court of Broome County
amend its original injunction against further elections under the ward
plan.'4 ' In response, the court recognized the need for an immediate
solution:
In this dilemma we turn reluctantly but of necessity to weighted
voting; but only as an expedient to insure the continuation of
government in the City of Binghamton until a constitutional districting plan is adopted. The weighting of a Councilman's vote is a
form of redistricting which will give constitutional validity to the
condemned districting plan because it satisfies the constitutional
142
test of equal representation.
Thus, the court ordered that the election be held under the old ward
plan, that the weighted voting device be instituted in council meet138

262 N.Y.S.2d at 449.

139 Even then, "significant population discrepancies exist between certain of the seven
councilmanic districts." Id. at 450.
140 Id. at 452. It should be noted, however, that in Dona v. Board of Supervisors, 48
lisc. 2d 876, 266 N.Y.S.2d 229, 232 (1966). discussed supra, the Supreme Court of St.
Lawrence County worked with the qualifying language here in Seaman, plus a specific
provision of the New York Constitution on voting rights, to conclude that patients in a
mental institution "must be excluded from the count of population."
141 Seaman v. Fedourich, 47 Misc. 2d 26, 262 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1965).
142 262 N.Y.S.2d at 593. The court refused to reduce the terms of present council members, declaring them to be de facto councilmen.
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ings,143 and that the council submit a new districting plan by a specified
date in the future.
Accordingly, the New York story of reapportionment and municipal
government continues.
D. State Court Activity in Summary
This survey of illustrative state court confrontations with reapportionment and local government points up some considerations of
genuine interest. Perhaps, therefore, a few summarizing observations
are in order.
The first question with which state courts have been forced to wrestle
has been the basic applicability of the one-man-one-vote principle to
local governments. Here the views of various state judges have been
witnessed, ranging from one end of the scale to the other. At one end
have been those who have argued that representation proportionate to
population is not a requirement at the local level, an argument which
could be most confidently presented prior to the Supreme Court's
recognition of the principle at the state level. At the other end of the
scale have been those who have insisted that the requirement obviously
does apply, to the extent of a dogmatic assertion that no further dis.
cussion of the question is even necessary. Between these two extremes
are positions of varying degrees. Some have found it more comfortable,
both before and after Reynolds, to attempt to handle the matter as one
of state law. In so doing, they can either maneuver around the federal
principle completely; or they can construct an equal representation
principle of sorts at the state law level. Still others have contended
strenuously that the applicability of the federal principle to local government is a question for the federal courts, and that the only responsibility of the state courts on the matter was to sit snugly until the Supreme Court decided to speak. Indeed, this has resulted in an outright
guessing game among state judges on what the Court would say.
One of the substantive arguments raised against the position of
applicability has been the point that the right to vote for local government officials is not one expressly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Those state judges who otherwise hold applicability have experienced
little difficulty in hurdling this argument.
143 Each councilman was to cast "a number of votes which shall be equal to one vote
for each five hundred or major part of five hundred, of the number of Inhabitants of
the ward from which he has been elected, as determined by the latest Federal Census
covering all wards in the City, except that no Councilman shall have less than one vote."
Ibid.
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Even assuming the basic applicability of the equal representation
requirement, other defenses have been raised for the fall-back convenience of reluctant courts. For instance, there is the self-help defense;
if the citizens involved have the means at hand to reconstitute their
governing bodies, the courts should not interfere. Although some state
courts have found this defense plausible, most have not.
The deeper considerations come after the conclusion of basic applicability has been reached. One of these considerations has been whether
the court must determine that the local government body in question is
one which exercises "legislative" powers before it can logically utilize
the principle. A number of state courts have obviously felt this step to
be a necessary one, to the point of enumerating functions performed by
the body in question and then characterizing them as "legislative."
Because the cases dealt with in this section have concerned either
county or municipal governing bodies, this could usually be accomplished without excessive effort. One state court has flatly asserted that
the principle could not be applied to units performing solely "administrative" duties, but most of the courts have simply not mentioned
the problem. At any rate, the performance of a mixture of "legislative"
and "administrative" functions has apparently not constituted sufficient
grounds for refusing application.
Even assuming the function to be one ordinarily performed by a
legislative body, additional questions can arise. For example, could the
state avoid the federal requirement by composing the body of nonelective officials? Although a question of considerable magnitude, most
state courts have treated it only in passing, a number assuming that the
state's constituting the office an appointive one would work the necessary magic of constitutional escape.
A still further problem has arisen over the relief to be granted by the
court when a local government body is held to be malapportioned. A
majority state court approach has consisted of the simple declaration of
unconstitutionality, plus specification of a deadline for self correction
before the court would exercise retained jurisdiction over the case. But
the advantages and disadvantages of weighted voting have been debated,
with a few courts taking this avenue, at least as a temporary solution.
Utilization of the additional device of the reduction of existing terms of
office has also been noted.
Lurking beneath the surface of all the methods of correcting malapportionment is the basic question of the proper approach to determining population. Despite only the limited attention thus far devoted
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to it, this appears a question capable of assuming considerable practical
proportions as the law evolves.
Finally, at least one of the state courts has been observed making
genuine inquiry into the possible impact of its decision of malapportionment upon local government as it presently exists in this country.
And although many would doubtless argue that local government
minus reapportionment is not worthy of long range concern, and that
the fear of domination of urban over rural is not a realistic one, still,
more thought to the future than most state courts have thus far been
willing to afford is an obvious necessity.
III. IN THE FEDERAL CoURTS

State court activity having now been probed, attention can be turned
to reapportionment and local government in the federal judiciary. Although the status of the law appears more settled in the federal courts,
due simply to the point that the Supreme Court has now spoken in part,
this plateau was not reached in a day. Indeed, an approach roughly
similar to that previously utilized can again be taken, starting with a
rather halting beginning and driving toward positions of more decisiveness.
A. A Note of Cautiousness
A number of the federal courts have indicated a sense of cautiousness
in rushing to conclusions on reapportionment and local government.
Ranging from negativeness to mere hesitation, a few illustrations of this
exercise of judicial caution might be appropriate; and an apt starting
point is provided by the district court's decision in Simon v. Lafayette
Parish Police Jury. 44 Here the plaintiff sought to redistrict the wards

in the parish of Lafayette, Louisiana, from which the members of the
Police Jury, the governing authority of the parish, were elected. 1'0
Holding that it had jurisdiction of the case, that state action was involved, and that the plaintiff possessed standing to sue, the court nevertheless denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 140 This was
done, said the court, because "any number of reasons for the present
system of ward districts in Lafayette Parish present themselves to mind
144 226 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. La. 1964).
145 He alleged that one of the wards with 65% of the parish population had only five
representatives and that the remaining nine wards, with a total of only 35% of the
population, elected nine representatives.
146 The court also noted the lack of necessity for a three-judge federal court. 226
F. Supp. at 802.
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immediately,"'147 and the parties should have an opportunity to prove
their positions. Some insight into the degree of the court's caution here
is indicated by its conclusion that "the rationality or reasonableness of
the system and the existence of a political remedy, will provide two of
the most conclusive factors in this case." 148
The Simon opinion thus purports to evidence greater sensitivity to
the self-help aspect than have many of the state courts.
Even more negative in tenor was the district court's opinion in Johnson v. Genesee County,149 an action to prevent the implementation of a
sewer improvement on the ground that it had been approved by a malapportioned Michigan county board of supervisors.5 0 The number of
questions decided by the court was unclear. It first held that settled
Michigan law prevented the invalidation of acts by an allegedly malapportioned board. It further noted that this was not an action to
correct alleged malapportionment, although the plaintiffs could have
narrowed the issue had they so desired. Then, however, the court submerged itself in a consideration of the equal representation requirement at the local government level. It noted that some state courts
which had found such a requirement had done so on the basis of state
1 1 Finally,
law, and that this approach was inapplicable to Michigan.2
the court concluded that
under the prevailing view of the United States Supreme Court,
...the composition of local units of government is held to be a
state matter. Under the rule of stare decisis, this Court is not free
to consider the subject of apportionment of~epresentatives on local
legislative bodies. It may well be that the time will come when the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment will be extended that
far.152

But the court thought it "more likely" that the Supreme Court's state
legislature decisions would result in legislatures which would "themId. at 303.
Ibid. The court further ordered written briefs on the question whether the Police
Jury was an indispensible party to the further proceedings.
'49 232 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
150 The plaintiffs alleged that 52% of the county's population was represented by only
41% of the board of supervisors. Said the Court: "These arc serious imbalanos." Id. at
568.
151 According to the court, Michigan law did not command county apportionment
according to population.
152 232 F. Supp. at 572. The court had already asserted that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor Article 4 of the Constitution of the United States, has so far been inter147

148

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss4/5

26

Sentell,: Reapportionment and Local Government

GEQRGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:596

selves establish in local legislative bodies a vastly different balance
13
between people and governmental power."'
If not assuming an outright negative position, Johnson at least illustrates a strong plea for Supreme Court direction. This is complemented
by its further belief that local government malapportionments will
right themselves with the coming of representative state legislatures. In
one sense, its sympathy too lies with a self-help approach.
The federal court in the Southern District of New York has witnessed a number of contests over reapportionment and local government. It dealt with a preliminary but crucial point in the case of McMillan v. Wagner,154 an action challenging the validity of New York
City charter provisions creating the "board of estimate," a body composed of various municipal officials. 1 5 The challenge was based on the
point that the voting power of the members of the board was not proportionate to the population which they represented, and a three-judge
court decision was requested. Noting that the material federal statute'50
required the convening of a three-judge court in appropriate cases in.
volving state statutes or state officials,'5 7 the court denied the request.
Here, explained the court, the charter in question was not a statute of
statewide application; and "the members of the Board of Estimate are
city officials acting as such, not officers of the state."'1 8 Accordingly, the
statute requiring a three-judge court was held inapplicable; and the
action was triable "in the regular way by a single judge."'0 "
A similar decision, but for a different reason,100 was rendered in
preted by the Supreme Court of the United States to require the apportionment of local
legislative bodies in a state in accordance with population." Id. at 570.
153 Id. at 572. That this case should not be decided by a three-judge court, see Johnson
v. Genesee County, 282 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
154 239 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
155 E.g., the mayor, comptroller, president of the city council, and the borough presidents. The functions of the board of estimate were never specified.
156 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
157 "Section 2281 provides that an interlocutory or permanent injunction 'restraining
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action

of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute

. . .

shall not

be granted upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the applica.
'" 239
tion therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges ....
F. Supp. at 33.
158 Ibid. Two state officials had been named defendants, but it was not alleged that
that they enforced or executed the charter.
159 Id. at 84.
160 "[Imt is our opinion that resolution of the appropriate steps to be taken to remedy
the disparity which presently exists under the current method of electing members of the
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Lodico v. Board of Supervisors,161 an attack upon the apportionment of
the county board. As resubmitted to the single district judge, 062 the
action was for reapportionment in a county where 43% of the county's
population could elect a majority of the board of supervisors. In summarizing developments in New York thus far, the court noted both the
willingness and the ability of the state courts "to endeavor to solve the
problem of disproportionate representation."' 16 3 In reaching its own
conclusion, the court expressed reservations over "trespassing into a
04
field which fundamentally belongs to the voters of the county."'
Preparations were underway to present a valid plan of apportionment
to the voters, explained the court, and "only when they evince a wilful
determination not to cure the disproportion in voting strength which
now admittedly exists should the courts interfere." 0 5 Although the
court did specify a deadline by which the submission to the voters
should take place, this new requirement of "wilfulness" is striking
indeed.
The Southern District's aura of permissiveness was again present in
Blaikie v. Wagner, 66 an action presenting an attack upon the apportionment of the New York City council, consisting of one councilman
from each of 27 districts substantially equal in population and of two
councilmen elected at large from each of five boroughs which were not
equal in population. Although conceding the existence of "persuasive
arguments"' 67 otherwise, the court thought the applicability of the oneman-one-vote principle to the municipal legislature was settled. Instead
of then proceeding to a conclusion of unconstitutionality, however, the
court delved into the history of representation in the council and the
Board of Supervisors is more properly the function of a single judge rather than of a
three-judge court." Lodico v. Board of Supervisors, 256 F. Supp. 440, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

161 256 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
162 Lodico v. Board of Supervisors, 256 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
163 Id. at 449. Indeed, "the parties might have been well advised to have continued to
have sought relief in the State courts of their community where the particular needs of

the voters of Rockland County would be better known to such courts and wider whose
supervision a plan could have been created." Id. at 449-50. This seems strange advice indeed when contrasted with the previously noted state court opinions holding the matter
one for the federal courts.
For a pre-Reynolds district court decision of similar tenor, see Hedlund v. Hanson, 213
F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1962).
164 256 F. Supp. at 450.
165 Ibid.
166

258 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
at 366.

167 Id.
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evolution of the present system.'0 8 True, the boroughs were unequal in
population; still, thought the court, the danger of the minority imposition of views upon the majority was unrealistic. Further, the city-wide
election of councilmen would entail the danger of a single party monopoly; moreover, the disparity in voting strength between the boroughs was only "minimal."'16 Thus,
the people of New York are fairly represented in their legislative
body.... The present system was deliberately designed to afford
at least the possibility of representation to a large segment of the
population and to enable them through party representation to
obtain it.170
71
Accordingly, relief was denied. '
B. A More Positive Voice
Among the federal courts too are those which have directly confronted local government reapportionment, those which have viewed
systems of representation not to their constitutional liking and proceeded to act. A chief example is the Maryland District Court in Ellis v.
Mayor & City Council,1 72 an action challenging the validity of both
existing and proposed apportionments of the municipal council.'1 3 Not
the least striking point of the court's opinion in the case was its assumption without discussion that the Reynolds principle applied to the
municipal council.1 7 4 Having cleared this considerable hurdle so easily,
the court could then focus its efforts upon the plans in question.
The existing plan of apportionment divided the municipality into
six districts and provided that the districts with less than 75,000 regis.
tered voters were to elect three representatives to the council and that
those with more than 75,000 voters were to elect four representatives.1 0
Holding the plan invalid, the court pointed out its inequality under
168

"IT]his plan was evolved after a lengthy and thoughtful study by two successive

commissions in order to make possible the election of minority representatives." Id. at 867.
169 Id. at 369.
170 Id.

at 369-70.

The court quoted the following language from McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961): "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it." 258 F. Supp. at 370.
172 234 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1964).
173 The action was brought by a resident and registered voter of Baltimore City.
174 The court simply cited the Reynolds line of cases and said nothing. See 284 r. Supp.
at 950.
175 This plan was set out in the municipal charter.
171
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either a population representation test or a registered voter representation test: 78 "[B]y either test, Section 16 fails to meet the requirements
77
of equal protection."'The proposed apportionment plan redefined the boundaries of the
various councilmanic districts, but retained the registered voter test as
the basis of representation 7 8 Those districts having not more than
70,000 voters would elect three members of the council, and those with
more than 70,000 would elect four councilmen. Because under this plan
a district with greater population but fewer registered voters was apportioned one less representative than another district,7 0 the court now
had to meet squarely the problem of whether the plan "is to be tested
by its impact on the population of Baltimore City, or upon the distribution of registered voters of Baltimore City, or both."18 0 Although conceding that "isolated phrases" throughout the Reynolds opinion referred to "voters" rather than population, the court thought that "a
careful reading" of Reynolds "makes clear that the basic constitutional
protection is one of equal representation by population, and not equal
representation by registered voters."' 8'
Consideration of registered voters is not improper if a valid result
based upon population is reached, but encouragement of voter
registration, although a worthy political and social objective, is not
sufficient to support a weighting of votes in the ratio of 1.66 to 1,
where the percentage of registration to population is approximately 36% in the first councilmanic district and approximately
33% in the second.'8 2Further, "where the formula gives a choice only between no less than
three councilmen nor more than four, it lacks flexibility and it can,
176 Under the plan, said the court, 46.5% of the population of the city could elect
12 of the 20 councilmen; and 40% of the registered voters could do so. 234 F. Supp. at
949-50.

177 Id. at 949. The court further decided against the plaintiff's contention that it could
not be left to a malapportioned body to reapportion itself, pointing out that this had
been the pattern of the Supreme Court's decisions in the state legislature cue
178 This plan had been prepared by a study commission prior to the Reynolds decision,
had been approved by the council, and was awaiting submission to the voters.
'79 The fifth district had almost 4,000 fewer inhabitants but nearly 14,000 more
registered voters than the fourth district.
180 234 F. Supp. at 953.
.81 Ibid. The argument was that "one-man-one-vote" relates to voters and not constituents.
182

Id. at 958.
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within a relatively short time, lead to grosser disproportions than we
18 3
find here."
Accordingly, the court enjoined the holding of further elections
under the existing plan, enjoined submission of the proposed plan to
the voters, and specified a time period within which the council must
propose a valid plan before it would exercise its retained jurisdiction.
The municipality appealed the invalidation of the proposed plan of
apportionment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.18 4 Although upholding the decision of the district court, the
court of appeals recognized the "force of the arguments"' 8 for utilizing
registered voters as the basis of representation. Nevertheless, the court
pointed out that here the use of the registered voter test did not affect
all areas of the municipality's population equally: "For example, in the
Sixth District voter registrants are 30% of the population, while in the
Third District voter registrants constitute 46% of the population-a
53% variation."'' 8 The court conceded the absence of any intimation
of inhibitions on the right to register and vote in Baltimore, "but the
danger inherent in the validation of a voter registration base is that it is
readily susceptible of abuse, and if abuses should arise the burden of
proving them would be difficult to sustain."'' s7
Thus the case was remanded for the exercise of the district court's
retained jurisdiction.
Moving away from local governing bodies, the case of Delozier v.
School Bd. 8 8 presented a challenge to the plan of representation
adopted by an interim school board in Pennsylvania, composed of nine
regions highly unequal in population each of which elected one member of the board. Considering other apportionment cases,'" the district
court held that the equal representation principle could be extended
183 Ibid.

184 Ellis v. Mayor & City Council, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965).
185 Id. at 128. The court had already upheld the district court's decision that the plan

gave the voters of the first district a disproportionate voice in the selection of city councilmen.

188 352 F.2d at 129. The court found a disparity between the fourth and fifth districts
exceeding 33%.
187 352 F.2d at 129. "Whether the mere possibility of such abuse" was sufficient to
invalidate the plan did not have to be decided here, however, as the court had already
upheld its invalidation on another ground.
188 247 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
189 E.g., Ellis v. Mayor & City Council, 234 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1964), Brouwer v.
Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1965), State ex rel Sonneborn v. Sylvester,
377 Mich. 666, 141 N.W.2d 120 (1966).
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to the school board. Admitting that the state legislature "could administer its school system other than by local elective boards,"'1' apparently free of the constitutional requirement, here the members were
elected by popular vote. Even so, what of the point that the unit here in
question was not a strictly "legislative" one in the usual sense? Merely
skirting this issue, the court noted that the board had been delegated
the power of school management, as well as the power of taxation, "and
in most local communities the various taxes levied by the school boards
are the largest local tax imposition."19 1 Did this mean that the more
revenue it could milk from its citizens the more "legislative" a unit
could become? True, the state greatly limited the powers which the
board could perform, but "these limitations are no less in scope or
variety than the limitations imposed on other governmental subdivi192
sions or municipal corporations.
Rejecting also the contention that the Supreme Court had not yet
spoken on the matter, the court declared the plan of representation
unconstitutional and specified a deadline after which no officer elected
under the plan could retain office. Finally, the submission of a new plan
was ordered.
An opinion in which the court left no doubt that the powers exercised by the local unit in question were sufficiently "legislative" was
that by the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi in
Martinolich v. Dean.193 Here challenged was the apportionment of a

county board of supervisors under which representatives were elected
from five districts in the county of highly unequal population.'9 Speculating that governmental agencies of "special or limited power and
jurisdiction"'19 5 might be distinguishable, this county board of supervisors, said the court, had been invested with "vast authority and
190 247 F. Supp. at 35.
191 Ibid. The court also cited Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). to the effect that the
right of an equal vote is the important thing no matter what the office.
192 Ibid. Was the court thus saying that a school board was as "legislative" in nature as
a municipal corporation?
193 256 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Miss. 1966).

194 This same apportionment had been challenged in the state courts in Glass v. Election
Comm'n, 250 Miss. 40, 156 So. 2d 825 (1963), but relief had been denied, largely on grounds
of the self-help defense, and the appeal had been dismissed by the Supreme Court in
378 U.S. 558 (1964), all discussed supra. Here the district court took jurisdiction "to
adjudicate the federal constitutional rights of the parties despite the disposition of Glass
and plaintiffs are entitled to have this court require that the shocking disparity of population among the supervisors' districts of Hancock County to be corrected." 256 F. Supp.
at 616.
195 Id. at 615.
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responsibility by the legislature.' 10 Actually, "they have legislative,
executive and quasi-judicial powers, duties and responsibilities."'1 7 Still
not satisfied, the court enumerated powers possessed by the board, in.
cluding those over taxation, roads, property acquisition, fiscal affairs,
zoning, and conservation of the peace. "In short, they are, to a large
extent, the government of their county."'"" Accordingly, the plan in
question, under which representatives of 24% of the county's population could bind a majority of the population, was declared invalid, and
an order was issued for a new plan by a specified time. g9
On this point of legislative vs. administrative functions, the strongest
case yet mentioned, both as to facts and decision, was Strickland v.
Burns.20o Under attack here was a special statute composing the county
school commission of eleven members, one to be elected from each of
the eleven school zones which zones, again, were highly unequal in population.2 01 The primary defense was "that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that ... a local representative governmental body which is primarily administrative rather
than legislative in character, conform to the 'one man, one vote' standard. .... -202 The commission's powers, the court noted, included those
over hiring school employees, pupil transportation, budgeting, and purchasing, but the unit possessed no powers of taxation. Thus, the prob2 03
lem was squarely presented.
By a two-to-one vote, the District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee held the Reynolds standard applicable to the school commission. According to the majority:
[S]ince we can find no basis for applying the "one man, one vote"
rule to the congeries of powers possessed by the Legislature itself
and at the same time denying its application to a subordinate body
simply because it possesses a fractional part of those powers, so
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 The court noted that the legislature had recently enacted a new alternative plan
under which supervisors who were residents of specified districts would be elected by the
county at large, and expressly declared that it had here given no consideration to this
new plan. Id. at 616.
200 256 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
201 One of the zones contained at least one-third of the county's entire poptlatiol.
202 256 F. Supp. at 825.
203 On the more basic issue, the majority reasoned that the Reynolds rationale "is
logically as applicable to the backwaters of representative government at the local level
as to the fountainhead of representative government at the state level." Id. at 826.
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long at least as the fractional part cannot Le said to be insignificant
or unimportant, we must also hold that the apportionment provisions of the Act complained of are void as violative of rights secured
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.- 04
Whether the majority was here holding the particular powers possessed
by the commission to be "legislative" is unclear. Did it purport to say
that any power not "insignificant or unimportant" delegated to a local
unit by the state legislature was a "legislative" power? Or rather, did it
intend to declare that application of the "legislative" label was no
longer necessary for susceptibility to the Reynolds principle? The concurring opinion would clearly adopt the latter approach: "it is fruitless,
in my view, to pursue the elusive distinction between legislative and
205
administrative functions."
The dissenting opinion here in Strickland simply thought that in
applying Reynolds the line should be drawn short of the factual situation in this case. The school commission was strictly an arm of the
reapportioned state legislature, and its powers "are administrative, not
legislative, in character."2 °6 It did not possess the power to tax, the
power to pass ordinances, nor any other "legislative" powers.
Once the Legislature is validly constituted, I do not believe there
is a constitutional requirement that personnel of its subservient
arms and agencies, created to perform purely administrative functions, must be elected on the "one man, one vote" basis.20Thus, three distinct views can be drawn from the opinions in Strickland v. Burns. At the least they made clear that the legislative vs. administrative distinction had become a considerable problem in certain
phases of reapportionment and local government.
C. The Zenith Answers-Or Does It?
In the discussion of reapportionment and local government thus far,
both as to state and federal court activity, certain rather well-defined
points of contention have obviously been building toward a climax.
These points have been observed recurring with an unusual degree of
consistency and being subjected to a diversity of approaches by the
at 827.
at 836. "The difference between this case and Reynolds v. Sims .. . is one of
degree and not of principle:'
206 Id. at 836.
207 Id. at 837.
204 Id.
205 Id.
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deciding courts. At the same time, the courts have been almost at one
in pleading for direction from above. From the most basic issue of the
mere applicability of Reynolds to local government, to the various
shadings of potential problems resulting from applicability, resolve has
been sought.
At this point, the United States Supreme Court has finally been confronted with some of these questions. What the Court did in answering
these questions, or in leaving them for another day, will now be probed.
(1) The Appropriate Tribunal
The point has been noted incidentally that in some of the federal
cases the question of the necessity of consideration by a three-judge
court has arisen. The Supreme Court has now spoken on this question
with seemingly strong convictions. First, however, the background of
the context in which the Court acted must be sketched.
The case of Bianchi v. Griffin 208 originated even prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Reynolds, but presented an attack upon a provision
of a New York county charter which constituted the county board of
supervisors of one representative from each of 10 towns varying greatly
in population. 09 By thus constituting the board and providing each
member with a vote of equal weight, it was argued that the provision
violated equal protection. Denying a motion to dismiss the complaint,
the District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that under
Baker v. Carr the cause was a justiciable one; and that "the issues presented are of such a nature as to warrant the convening of a three-judge
court."210

The three-judge court which then heard the case wrote an opinion
which summarized in considerable detail the developments thus far in
respect to reapportionment and local government. 211 No question existed, said the court, of the disparity of population representation present in this case. 212 Rather, the more basic question was the applicability
of the Reynolds principle to it; and this "question is not easy to decide.
Like so many legal problems, the solution may well be dependent upon
degree."21 3 As to the power of a three-judge court to act in the case, the
208 217 F. Supp. 166 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
209 The populations of the towns, it was alleged, varied from 1,367 to 191,280. Id. at 167.
210 Id. at 168.
211 Bianchi v. Grifling, 238 F. Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
212 The town lines were never intended to be drawn on a population basis, said the
court. Id. at 999.
213 Id. at 1000. Between the extreme cases, thought the court, "lie the many minor gov.

ernmental units referred to such as fire, water, school districts, towns, villages and cities."
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court wondered whether "this provision of the Suffolk Charter... [is]
of such statewide interest as to be within the jurisdiction of such a
court."

2 14

The basic questions thus presented, the court noted the possibility of
forthcoming corrective action by a reapportioned state legislature as
well as the statutory authorization for self-correction by the county
board itself.215 Torn, then, between its apparent conclusion of Reynolds'
applicability, 216 and its strong desire to see the problem handled locally,
the court compromised:
To retain jurisdiction in the three-judge court to await developments in the state legislature or within the County itself with
respect to the selection of the County's legislative body, presents a
third alternative.2 1 7
Adopting this alternative, the court denied the plaintiffs' application
for an injunction, but retained jurisdiction of the case "in the event
that an appropriate governing body has not been created for Suffolk
2 18
County within the permitted standards for representation."
No local handling of the problem materializing, the plaintiffs renewed their application for relief to the three-judge court, and that
court rendered a decision on June 15, 1966.219 In its opinion, the court
summarized local efforts toward solving the problem, especially four
corrective plans considered by a study committee, 2 0 and concluded that
"it is obvious... that there must be a change in the voting power of
each of the present County supervisors. . . ."=1 Then taking its cue

from the New York state courts,--- the district court ordered the imple214 Id. at 1001.
215 Either on its own motion or upon citizen initiative. Id. at 1003.

216 "In county-wide administration, just as in state-wide administration, the inhabitants
of the populated areas should not be governed by representatives from other and thinly
populated areas." Id. at 1004.
217 Ibid. Others were to deny federal jurisdiction and to dismiss the complaint.
218 Id. at 1005. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court declared that "the motion

to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction." Grifling v.
Bianchi, 382 U.S. 15 (1965).
219 Bianchi v. Griffing, 256 F. Supp. 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
220 These plans were summarized as taking the following approaches: "weighted voting,"
"districting," "at-large," and "miscellaneous." Id. at 619. The county board had been
unable to agree upon any one plan.
221 256 F. Supp. at 621.
222 E.g., Seaman v. Fedourich, 45 Misc. 2d 940. 258 N.YS.2d 152 (1965); Shilbury v.
Board of Supervisors, 46 Misc. 2d 837, 260 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1965).
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mentation, as a "stopgap" 223 measure, of a weighted voting formula.2 2 '
This formula was to be utilized by the board until it had provided a
22
permanent plan of reapportionment by a specified deadline. 1
Discussion of the progress of Bianchi through the federal courts will
be temporarily interrupted at this point to pick up a similar development elsewhere. In the case of Moody v. Flowers2 2' a three-judge district
court for the Middle District of Alabama was petitioned to invalidate
statutory apportionments of the boards of county commissioners of two
Alabama counties. 227 Each of these boards consisted of representatives
elected from specified county districts which we:re highly unequal in
population. 22 s Without mentioning the appropriateness of the case for
three-judge court consideration, the court plunged into a discussion of
the applicability of the Reynolds principle to the county boards. And,
on June 14, 1966, by a two-to-one decision, the principle was declared
inapplicable.
The majority opinion began by noting the absence of any Supreme
Court decision in favor of the plaintiffs' position. Indeed, the opinion
drew nourishment from language in Reynolds proclaiming that
political subdivisions of states-counties, citie;, or whatever-never
were and never have been considered as sovereign entities, Rather,
they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental
instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of
2
state governmental functions. 29
Moreover, these county boards had been in existence only a short time,
neither had the power to reapportion itself, and relief was available
through the election of sympathetic state legislators. 28 0 As long as the
223 256 F. Supp. at 622.

224 The formula assigned to each supervisor "a number of votes equal to the number,
to the nearest whole number, obtained by dividing the population of his Town (1960
federal census) by 5,000, providing that no supervisor shall have less than one vote." Id.
at 622.
225 This plan was to be submitted to the electorate of the county at the November 1966
election.
226 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966). For another discussion of the court's dedslon, see
Note, 53 VA. L. R:v. 953 (1967).
227 Houston County and Randolph County.
228 One county had five districts and the other four. In one 61 % of the population had
only a 21% voice on the board; and in the other 49% of the population had only a

29% voice.
2
256 F. Supp. at 199, quoting from 877 U.S. 533 at 575.
20 All these factors went to show the absence of "invidious discrimination." 256 F. Supp.
at 199.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

37

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 5
REAPPORTIONMENT

1967]

state legislature was equally apportioned, "the courts ought not to
interfere with county governments of limited, as distinguished from
general, power, and which have been created by the legislature as involuntary political subdivisions of the state." 23 1
The majority of the district court refused to conjecture about what
the Supreme Court would eventually do with reapportionment and
local government,23 2 as well as with the "semantics" of dividing the
powers of county boards into "legislative," "judicial," and "administrative" categories.233 In any event, noted the opinion, the Alabama Constitution prohibited the delegation of "qualitative or quantitative
234
legislative power."
A strong dissenting opinion in Moody thought it "inescapable"2' 3
that the Reynolds principle be given application to the county boards.
Indeed, "rather than limit the principles of Reynolds,... it would seem
that these principles might well have their most meaningful application
237
at the local level."23 6 Discounting cases relied upon by the majority,
the dissent refused to accept the idea that "the states may conduct their
affairs with absolute discretion through their local agencies or appendages without recognizing and complying with basic constitutional
23 8
principles."
Thus, the division of the district court in Moody was a sharp one.
Because Bianchi and Moody were decided by the respective district
courts at approximately the same time, and as appeals were taken in
each case, the United States Supreme Court could note "probable jurisdiction" of the cases together, 23 9 and later decide them in a single
opinion.2 4 This opinion was written for a unanimous court by Mr.
Justice Douglas, and instead of proceeding to finally declare which of
the district courts had properly devined the correct meaning of Rey231 Id. at

200.

232

It noted that courts had gone both ways on the question.

233

256 F. Supp. at 200.
201.

234 Id. at
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid.

237 E.g., Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 43 So. 2d 514 (La. 1949); Glass v.
Election Comm'n, 250 Miss. 40, 156 So. 2d 825 (1963).
238 256 F. Supp. at 203. At least, argued the dissent, the court should retain jurisdiction
of the case and give the state a reasonable time in which to reapportion the county boards.

Id. at 204.
239
240

Sailors v. Board of Education, 385 U.S. 966 (1966).
Moody v. Flowers, 87 S. Ct. 1544 (1967).
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nolds, he fashioned a fundamental lesson on the "threshold question in
these cases.

241

That question, the Justice proclaimed, revolved around determining
the appropriate tribunal for these contests in the first instance. Elabo-

2 4 2 the Surating, he explained that under the material federal statute,

preme Court could take direct appeals from the district courts only if
the case had been one requiring decision by a three-judge court in the
first instance. And, he added, such decision was required only when an
injunction was sought to restrain a state officer from enforcing or executing a state statute. 243 This did not include a case which simply

involved a state statute, but only one in which "a state statute of general
and statewide application is sought to be enjoined.."244 The question

to be answered here then was whether either Bianchi or Moody had
been such a case.
Approaching Moody first, the Court held that the apportionment
statute under attack related solely to one county in the state and thus
was not a statute of statewide application. The fact that it was an enactment of the state legislature, and that state officers had been named as
defendants in the suit, could not change the result. The argument that
this statute was only a replica of apportionment statutes applying to 29
other counties in Alabama, thus giving the case a statewide interest, was
rejected. "Even a variety of different devices, working perhaps to the
same end, still leaves any one device local rather than statewide for
245
purposes of the statutory three-judge court."
With this determination of Moody, the decision in Bianchi appeared
almost a foregone conclusion. The apportionment challenged here was
provided by the county charter, "similar to a local ordinance, a challenge to which cannot support a three-judge court."2

40

Again, the point

that the charter had been enacted into state law was held immaterial.
241 Id.

at 1546.

only
242 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964). "This court has jurisdiction of these direct appeals ...
if the respective actions were 'required . . . to be heard and determined by a district
court of three judges.'" 87 S. Ct. at 1547.
243 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964). This statute "requires that a three-judge court be convened
in any case in which a preliminary or permanent injunction is sought to restrain 'the
enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any
officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute.'" 87 S.Ct. at 1547.
244 Id. at 1548. Neither did it apply when "an action is brought against state officers
enforcing matters of purely local concern."
245 Id. at 1548.
246 Ibid. "It does not remotely resemble a state statute of general, statewide application."
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One other argument available in Bianchi, however, was that the
charter provision in question was interchangeable with a New York
statute which did have statewide application. Alas, however, the complaint in the case had been directed only to the charter provision and
that was all the three-judge court had considered in rendering its
decision.
Accordingly,
Since the "statute" in each of these cases is one of limited application, concerning only a particular county involved in the litigation, a three-judge court was improperly convened. Appeals should,
therefore, have been taken to the respective courts of appeals, not
24 7
to this Court.
The cases were remanded to the district courts so that those courts could
enter fresh decrees "from which appellants may, if they wish, perfect
24 8
timely appeals to the respective courts of appeals."
A determination on which of these district courts reached the correct
conclusion on reapportionment and local government may yet be forthcoming. For the time being, however, the Supreme Court's lesson on the
appropriate tribunal forestalls that event. And a close reading of the
opinion reveals that the Court apparently feels no pressure to accelerate
its arrival.
(2) Legislative vs. Administrative and Elective vs. Appointive
In both the state and federal cases on reapportionment and local government, two other questions have arisen with some degree of regularity.
First, although a court might agree that the one-man-one-vote principle
applies to local government generally, must it make a preliminary determination in each individual case that the local unit in question performs what can be designated "legislative" rather than "administrative"
functions? Lengthy debate had raged over this question in the decided
cases thus far described, and the positions of various courts and judges
have been noted.
The other question, not quite as prominent in the judicial opinions,
revolves around whether the principle, if applicable to local government at all, applies only to "elective" rather than "appointive" local
officials. With this comes the companion inquiry of whether a state
might thus be able to avoid applicability of the Reynolds principle to
247 87 S. Ct. at 1549.
248 Ibid.
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its local governments by purporting to constitute them of "appointive"
officials.
The Supreme Court too has now spoken of these questions, but again
the route to the top must first be traced.
In Sailors v. Board of Education249 the validity of a Michigan statute
governing the organization of county school boards was placed in issue.
The system provided for the popular election of a local school board for
each district in the county, and this provision was not in question. The
challenge went to the further provision that delegates from each local
board, from these districts of unequal population, would meet biennially to elect a five-member county board of education. The plaintiffs
alleged this latter provision to effect great discrimination against the
residents of one district in the county which possessed 55.6% of the
county's total population.
By a two-to-one division, the three-judge district court for the Western District of Michigan refused to apply the Reynolds principle to the
county board of education and thus to invalidate the statute.5 0 Noting
that the Supreme Court had not yet faced the question here presented,
the majority opinion preferred to rely upon the district court's decision
in Johnson v. Genesee County.251 It summarized its position as follows:
We recognize that the Supreme Court of the United States may at
some time in the future reach the conclusion that the District
Courts of the United States have the power and duty to prescribe
guide lines for the selection of the many boards and commissions
created and organized in connection with local government. We
are satisfied that the Supreme Court of the United States has not
yet reached that point. We are satisfied that we should not antici2 62
pate that the Supreme Court will reach that point.
A lengthy dissenting opinion 258 emphasized the degree of discrimination present here, compared it with the Georgia "county unit system"
invalidated in Gray v. Sanders2 6 at the state level, and maintained that
249 254 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
250 The two divisions of the court did agree that challenged student transfers under
the plan were valid as acts of a de facto board.
251 232 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Mich. 1964), discussed supra.
252

254 F. Supp. at 29.

Id. at 18. Because of the previously noted agreement between the two divisions, the
opinion was said to be "dissenting in part."
254 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
253
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the Reynolds principle must be applied to the county board.23 Indeed,
the dissent thought it "completely out of spirit" 2 0 with Reynolds
to say that a citizen, guaranteed by his state constitution that the
public education of his children shall be provided for by the state
legislature, an apportioned body directly responsible to him, an
be denied this fair representation by the action of that legislature
in delegating this function to a statutorily created agency of the
state which is not responsive to the population on an equal representation basis .... 257
Thus split, the district court's decision in Sailors was appealed to the
Supreme Court and "probable jurisdiction" was noted by that Court.-"s
The Supreme Court, again in an opinion written by Mr. Justice
Douglas, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.2 9 The first point covered by the Court 0- 0 -as the electiveappointive consideration. Even assuming the Reynolds principle to
apply to an elective local official, said the Court, "the Michigan system
for selecting members of the county school board is basically appointive
rather than elective."2 61 True, conceded the Court, the delegates who
elected the county board had first been elected by the people of the
county, but these delegates were completely uncontrolled in the casting
of their votes.262 Thus it was evident, the Court concluded, "that the
membership of the county board is not determined, directly or indirectly, through an election in which the residents of the county participate." 21 Apparently implicit in this conclusion was the position that
Reynolds did not apply to an appointive local officer.2 4
255

"The Kent Intermediate Board of Education, as do all such Boards in the State of

Michigan, exercises powers of a legislative, as well as administrative and quasi-judicial
character." 254 F. Supp. at 23.
2.6 Id. at 25.
257 Ibid.
258 385 U.S. 966 (1966),
2-59 Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967). Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred
in the result, but without separate opinions.
260 The Court did note in passing that this had been an appropriate three-judge court
case as the statute was one of statewide application. 387 U.S. at 107.
261 Id. at 109.
262 Id. at 109, n.6.
263 Ibid. "The 'electorate' under the Michigan system is composed not of the people
of the county, but the delegates from the local school boards."
264 The Court noted that "save and unless the state, county, or municipal government
runs afoul of a federally protected right, it has vast leeway in the management of its
internal affairs." 387 U.S. at 109.
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Did this mean, then, that a state might be able to escape the applicability of the principle to its local governments by constituting them
appointive officers? In reserving this question "for other cases, ' 20 1 the
Court fell back on the legislative-administrative consideration. That is,
explained the Court, "the County Board of Education performs essentially administrative functions; and while they are important, they are
not legislative in the classical sense." 2 0 Apparently implicit in this conclusion was the position that a state was free to constitute local adminis2 7
trative offices of appointive officials.
If the legislative-administrative distinction was this crucial, what was
the test to be used in determining that the functions in this case were
administrative ones? Instead of providing an answer to the question, the
Court simply enumerated some of the powers possessed by the county
board of education under Michigan law. These included the powers
over appointing school superintendents, preparing budgets, levying
taxes, distributing delinquent taxes, employing teachers, establishing
schools for children in juvenile homes, and transferring areas from one
school district to another.2 68 What was there about these powers which
were "not legislative in the classical sense"?
The Court concluded that
since the choice of members of the county school board did not
involve an election and since none was required for these nonlegislative offices, the principle of "one man-one vote" has no
269
relevancy.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Sailors, therefore, was important
both for what it did and did not decide. First, it did not decide that
the one-man-one-vote principle was applicable to local government.
Indeed, it was willing to merely assume applicability only to those
offices which could be termed elective. Secondly, the elective vs. ap.
pointive consideration becomes an important one. And thirdly, in
working with this consideration, the legislative vs. administrative question is crucial, but no test was evolved to solve it. Finally, and perhaps
most important of all, the Court evidenced a view of considerable
265

Ibid.

266 Ibid.
267 Indeed, the Court stated that "at least as respects non-legislative officers, a State can

appoint local officials or elect them or combine the elective and appointive systems as was
done here." Ibid.
268 387 U.S. at 109, n.7.
269 387 U.S. at 109.
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permissiveness in respect to reapportionment and local government
270
generally.
(3) Election at Large
The at-large election is ordinarily designated as one of the possible
answers to the inequality of the population representation quandary. --'
Indeed, what could constitute a better solution than throwing the election for the office in question open to all the voters in the political unit
involved? Although this solution may not be practical at higher governmental levels, this is not as true at the level of local government, where
it apparently is being utilized to a considerable degree. This utilization
has thus cast the election at large, or at least a species of it, into the
cross fire of the federal courts and has resulted in a pronouncement by
the Supreme Court itself. This, then, is the segment of reapportionment
and local government to be discussed here.
In Reed v. Mann272 the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia was confronted with the argument that a system entailing the
election at large of one county commissioner residing in each of four
commissioner districts was unconstitutional.?- 3 This system, it was contended, could result in the will of the residents of a district being overridden by the county wide vote. These residents, it was asserted, were
"entitled to choose and elect commissioners on a district basis."-' - 4
In refusing to adopt the plaintiffs' position, the three-judge district
court viewed its function as "to first determine the geographical unit,
and then to see if the voters in the unit are treated equally."2TO This,
said the court, "is the one-man one-vote admeasurement.2 7 GHere the
political unit involved was determined to be the county itself, "and it is
plain that every voter in the county is treated equally."2 -7- The court
could find nothing improper in the requirement that each of the four
county commissioners were to be residents of the specified districts;
indeed,
270 "We see nothing in the Constitution to prevent experimentation." Ibid.
271 See, e.g., Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on
Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUhr. L. REv. 21, 40-41 (1965).
272 237 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
273 "The county was divided into four commissioner districts, and it was provided that
no twvo commissioners, excluding the chairman, could reside in the same district." Id. at 23.
274 Id. at 24.
275 Ibid.

276 Ibid.
277 Ibid.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss4/5

44

Sentell,: Reapportionment and Local Government

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:596

The residence requirement in effect diffused the representation
over the county while giving each elector of the county by virtue
278
of county at large elections a voice in the selection process.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed. 279
At odds with the Reed opinion was the philosophy of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the case of Davis v. Dusch.280 Here in
question was the validity of the apportionment oE the council of the
City of Virginia Beach2 81 providing for eleven councilmen, all to be
elected by city-wide vote, but requiring that seven of the councilmen be
residents of the seven municipal boroughs, which boroughs were highly
unequal in population. 282 As to these seven councilmen, the argument
proceeded, the larger boroughs were underrepresented to the advantage
of the smaller boroughs. 283 Thus again, could the election at large confer validity on the plan?
Condemning the plan, the circuit court viewed the Reynolds principle as cutting much deeper than guaranteeing equality in voting:
The principle of one-person-one-vote extends also to the level of
representation, and exacts approximately equal representation of
the people-that each legislator, State or municipal, represent a
28 4
reasonably like number in population.
The fact that each councilman was elected by the voters of the entire
city was discounted by reasoning that "his naturally dominating provincial interest 285 would still cause him to represent his borough rather
than the municipality as a whole. And if this should cause the voters to
278 Ibid.
279 To the argument that in other Georgia counties the commissioners were elected on
a district basis, the court said: "we can take judicial notice of the fact that there are
many forms of county and municipal governments in use in Georgia but each of these
local governments is a geographical unit into itself, and it is to the residents of the
particular unit that the one-man-one-vote rule is to be applied." Ibid.
280 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966).
281 The apportionment of this council, it will be recalled, had previously been challenged in the state courts where, in Davis v. Dusch, 205 Va. 676, 139 SE.2d 25 (1964),
the Supreme Court of Virginia had denied relief. The plan there challenged, however,
had later been invalidated by the federal district court in an unreported opinion of 1965,
and the present plan had then been adopted. The district court had held this plan valid,
and an appeal was taken to the Fourth Circuit.
282 The populations of the boroughs ranged from a low of 733 to a high of 29,048.
861 F.2d at 496.
283 The other 4 councilmen were assigned to the city at large.
284 561 F.2d at 497: ". .. [FYull compliance with the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, we think, is still wanting."
285 Id. at 498.
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refuse to reelect him, it "would not remove the inequality in representation, for the choice of a successor would still be limited to the same
district." 286
In reaching its decision, the court was forced to acknowledge the
Supreme Court's actions in Fortson v. Dorsey, 87 sustaining the validity
of a reapportionment plan for the Georgia State Senate which included
the requirement that senators from multi-district counties reside in a
specified district but be elected by county-wide vote. Distingiushing the
present case, the court noted that in Fortsonthere was substantial equality of population among the districts.2 88 Viewing the danger of inequality here a realistic one, therefore, the circuit court invalidated the
apportionment but allowed its continuation until the next session of
the state legislature.28 9
Postponing consideration of jurisdiction of the case to a hearing on
its meritsm ° the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the circuit court.291 Again writing the Supreme Court's opinion,2 - 2 Mr. Justice
Douglas went to pains to point out that both here and in Sailors the
Court was reserving the basic question of Reynolds' applicability to
local government. Assuming applicability arguendo,29 3 however, the
Court held the Virginia Beach apportionment permissible under the
Reynolds test of "invidious discrimination."2 9 This plan, concluded
the Court, made "no distinction on the basis of race, creed, or economic
status or location,"' - 5 and all the councilmen were elected by all the
voters of the municipality. The point so troublesome to the circuit
court, i.e., the requirement that seven councilmen be residents of specified boroughs, was termed by the Supreme Court "not fatal."12 06
286 Ibid. The court termed "unrealistic" the "assumption that the member from the
smaller populated political subdivision would give, or could humanly be expected to give,
the far greater populated subdivisions representation equal to that he accords his residence

constituency."
287 379 U.S. 435 (1965).
288 This, thought the court, had been crucial to the validity of the plan. 361 F.2d at 498.
289 Should corrective action not then be taken, the court warned, it would give relief
in the case.
290 Dusch v. Davis, 585 U.S. 999 (1967).
291 Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
292 Again, Justices
Harlan and Stewart concurred in the result without separate
opinions.
293 387 U.S. at 114.
294 Id. at 116. "The constitutional test under the Equal Protection Clause is whether
there is an 'invidious' discrimination."

295 387 U.S. at 114.
296 Ibid.
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Analogizing to Fortson v. Dorsey, the Court thought that even with
the residence requirement, the councilman was "nonetheless the city's,
not the borough's councilman. '297 True, conceded the Court, in Fortson the districts were of substantially equal population. Still, it was not
persuaded that a councilman residing in a borough would in fact represent only the borough.298
Finally, as possible evidence of the Court's realization that applicability of the Reynolds principle to local government generally would
give rise to many unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable, questions, is
the following pronouncement:
The Seven-Four Plan seems to reflect a detente between urban and
rural communities that may be important in resolving the complex
problems of the modern megapolis in relation to the city, the sub2 09
urbia, and the rural countryside.
On this concluding note, the apportionment plan was upheld.
D. Federal Court Activity in Summary
This discussion of reapportionment and local government in the federal courts reveals considerable activity here too. Basic to a summary of
this activity is the obvious conclusion that many of the questions raised
at the state court level have plagued the federal courts as well. If more
of a semblance of certainty appears present at the federal level, close
observation reveals this to be, in large part, illusory.
On the basic question of applicability of the Reynolds principle to
local government generally, the judges here too have played the entire
scale. Those courts tinged with some reluctance on this question have
reacted with various cautionary maneuvers. Some have indicated sympathy for the self-help contention to a considerable degree, even to the
point of requiring "wilful" refusal to correct on the part of the electorate before entering the picture. Others have professed to believe that
the correction of malapportionment at the local level will constitute a
beneficial by-product of the reapportionment of state legislatures. Accordingly, they too have counseled judicial caution. Still other of the
lower federal courts have argued that the initial judicial responsibility
lies elsewhere-either with the Supreme Court or, of all places, with
the state courts, which are said to be more familiar with the localities
297
298
dence
299

Id. at 116.
"If a borough's resident on the council represented in fact only the borough, resl.
being only a front, different conclusions might follow." Ibid.
Id. at 116.
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involved. Finally, some of the courts have reluctantly declared applicability, only to conclude that the apportionment in question, when
viewed realistically, entailed no actual danger of minority domination.
Other federal courts, of course, have responded in a more positive
voice. Among those responding affirmatively has been discovered the
position that equality of population, rather than equality of registered
voters, was the test to be applied. Once held applicable to local governing bodies, how much further is the principle to be extended? It has
already been carried by some of the courts to such bodies as the local
school boards.
The basic contrast between the negative or cautious courts and the
more positive, affirmative ones is that, on one hand, any arm or creation
of a validly apportioned state legislature is untouched by the Reynolds
principle, while, on the other hand, the reapportionment of state legislatures is a useless requirement if they can then effectively operate
through unrepresentative local units.
The dearest point yet established by the Supreme Court on reapportionment and local government is that Court's outright refusal to pass
on this question of applicability thus far. Although it might now have
done so in three cases, it has "reserved" the question in two of these,
and lectured on the proper lower tribunal to handle the cases in the
other. Those who like to litigate dangerously can read whatever they
wish into the Court's assumption arguendo that the principle does apply to local elective legislative bodies.
Assuming applicability of the principle to local government, the
further questions which might be raised seem limitless. For instance,
regardless of the varying positions of the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court now appears to have determined that the consideration of
whether a local office is an "elective" one or an "appointive" one is all
important. It also appears to have determined that in working with this
consideration, one further important factor is whether the office performs what can be designated "legislative" functions or "non-legislative"
ones. Thus, what some courts had termed a "fruitless" exercise has now
become a crucial one. Unfortunately, the Court has yet evolved no
standards for recognizing "legislative" functions; indeed, it has taken
one of the most basic governmental functions of all, the power of taxation, and held it not necessarily "legislative."
Even the election at large, ordinarily recommended as one of the
safest alternatives to malapportionment, has created problems in the
federal courts. Not until the Supreme Court considered this point could
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it be said just how deeply the knife of equality cut. Unless the district
residence requirement is only a "front," however, the Court has now
approved its utilization in connection with an at-large election system
of representation.
Pervading the Supreme Court's approaches in tie three decisions it
has thus far rendered on reapportionment and local government has
been a noticeable air of permissiveness, a general approval of state "experimentation" with its local governments. This, coupled with an express recognition of the complexities of validly accommodating the
often conflicting urban-rural interests in this country, indicates that per.
haps the Court too has learned from the experiences here unfoldedaoo
IV.

CONCLUSION

Little seems appropriate in the way of a conclusion. The problem has
been put, the revolving questions have been posed, the contexts in
which these questions have arisen have been described, and the attempts
by the various courts to grapple with them have been observed. This
was the purpose of the effort.
What is occurring, of course, is a period of growing pains, even at
this late date, for the already highly developed fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution. The provision of that amendment
3oo An indication that the Court might now be preparing to deal with reapportionment
and local government in greater detail than it has thus far was its grant of certiorari,
87 S.Ct. 2106 (1967), at the conclusion of its last term, in Avery v. Midland County, 400
S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1966), a decision by the Supreme Court of Texas on the apportionment
of the county commissioners' court of Midland County, Texas, and on the redistricting
of that county. In Avery, a majority of the Texas court held that the four precincts within
the county, each of which elected one commissioner, were highly unequal in population
and that the districting of the county was thus invalid. Although the court concluded that
the commissioners' court was the "governmental body" for the county, whose primary
function was "the administration of the business affairs of the county," It still held that
"its legislative functions are negligible and county government is not otherwise comparale
to the legislature of a state or to the federal Congress where the 'one man, one vote'
principle is asserted in its most exacting and compelling sense." The court was also concerned that "the voice of the rural areas will be lost for all practical purposes If the commissioners' precincts of counties are apportioned solely on a population basis . . . .Yet,
important affairs of the county administered by the commissioners court-such as roads,
bridges, taxable values of large land areas-disproportionately concern the rural areas."
On this reasoning, the court held that the redistricting of the county on the basis of
population alone would constitute error, and that
the convenience of the people in the particular circumstances of a county may require
-and constitutionally justify-a rational variance from equality in population in
commissioners precincts upon the basis of additional relevant factors such as number
of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values.
Thus, the Supreme Court's work is cut out.
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here being judicially evolved is the little-used one of equal protection,

and the subject around which it is being evolved is the seldom-considered one of local government. Both these points add color to the
event.ol

The impact of the background here described is considerable and
points in the direction of future judicial efforts. To capsule this con-

sideration of reapportionment and local government in the unfortunate
language of these turbulent times, there has been much smoke, a few

sparks, but many yet untorched fires remain to be quenched.
301 And, as we have been recently reminded by Professor Freund, " . . constitutional
guarantees like.. . equal protection of the laws do not supply ready-made answers to
concrete, changing and unforseen problems as those problems arise in life." Freund,5-to-I:
Are the Justices Really Objective?, Harvard Today 25 (Spring 196).
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